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A PERSPECTIVE ON WESTERN SMALL BUSINESSES 
AND THEIR CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
Prepared by Duane D. Pearsall 
for 
The Western Governors Policy Office (WESTPO} 
November 7, 1981 
INTRODUCTION 
Presented at the· annual meeting of WESTPO, 1980, a study directed by the 
WESTPO staff revealed that almost 70% of all employed persons in this region 
worked for small business. Compared with the natiOnal ·average of 56%~ this 
one characteristic alone identifies our region as primarily dependent upon its 
small business economy. 
WESTPO has also estimated total population impacts using a· factor of 4.92 
times the prime new energy jobs created. It follows ·then· that at least 3 out 
of 5 new jobs supporting this expected in-migration of people will be involved 
in small business. · 
If these assumptions are valid, then it is also valid that, comparatively~ the 
economic health of the WESTPO region can be measured by.the economic health of 
its small business community. 
Unfortunately, such a diagnosis of the heal th of our small business sector 
requires the use of national rather than regional statistics. One of the most 
visible symptons of an illness is the rate of bankruptcies. 
A recent report of the National Small Business Association, dated September 
21, 1981, reveals the following: 
Court-filed bankruptcies from mid-1975 to mid-1979, did not vary more than 10% 
year to year, and averaged 31,000 per year. However, within a few months 
after the Federal Reserve Ac ti ans of October 1979 which boosted interest rates 
to the then-record levels, business bankruptcies began to climb dramatically. 
Totals reached an average of nearly 3,800 per month in the spring of 1980, 
.climbing to a new plateau of about 4,000 per month by June, 1981. Thus, the 
business bankruptcy level increased 63.57% from the beginning of October~ 1979 
to the end of June, 1980. 
These figures are very conservative for two 
Bradstreet figures do not include finance, 
industries where small businesses predominate. 
reasons. First, the Dun & 
insu~ance, and real estate 
I 
Second, they do not include business closures or "walkaways." These are 
businesses that just close their doors and terminate their business. They 
may owe creditors nothing, or, they may have substantial debts which are 
satisfied through attachments on bank accounts or foreclosing tax liens or 
mortgages, leaving few assets for general creditors to pursue. There appears 
to be no overall source of statistics on these 11 walkaways 11 , but the Small 
Business Admi ni strati on estimates that 400,000 to 450,000 businesses per year 
in an average year (1975-1979) go out of business for a variety of reasons. 
It would not be unreasonable then to estimate that there are approximately 14 
business closures for every court-filed D&B-listed bankruptcy. 
Assuming that total business closures are directly proportional to changes in 
the rate of bankruptcies, and further assuming the SBA 11 average 11 business 
closure is reasonable, the current rate of business closures should 
approximate 650,000 to 700,000 per year. Attached is a graph (Exhibit 1) 
comparing the prime rate, quoted from the Federal Reserve bulletin and the D&B 
Business Failure Rate, by quarter from 1978 through first quarter 1981. Note 
that although the prime rate is a more volatile curve, the sad fact is that 
the rate of business failures matches, all too painfully close, the prime rate 
Another less visible symptom of an illness in the small business sector is its 
reducing contribution to. Gross National Product. Since GNP is calculated by 
di vi ding the dollars of output by the numbers of bodies (not cost) of labor, 
and since small business is characteristically more labor-intensive than big 
business, its contribution to GNP is probably underestimated. Nevertheless, a 
contribution in 1972 of approximately 46% of the GNP has eroded t~ 
approximately 43% in 1980, with the difference, of course, being made up by 
the increasing contribution by the larger business sector. The continuing 
downward trend, however, is a strong suggestion that the illness is terminal~ 
i 
Many contri bu ting reasons can be i denti fi ed such as over-regulation,\ 
government tax policy, etc. As a personal opinion, most of these governmen~ 
impediments would correct themselves if small business were to occupy its: 
proper seat at the negotiating tables of government policy. 1 
I 
of: A third symptom of this i 11 ness is evident from a review of the few sources 
capital available, particularly the lack of access to major pools 
investment capital such as pension or profit-sharing funds. 
I 
Of\ 
I. 
I 
! 
Another perspective would be to compare the reactions of small businesses with; 
those of multi-national corporations in the event of an emergency such as'. 
occurred in March, 1980, when credit controls were imposed by the Federal 
Reserve. Many small businesses experienced a cut-off in credit from their 
only source of capital, the local bank. The compounded effect of this was sd 
crippling to small business that subsequent small business relief was required\ 
to prevent a disaster. t 
How multi-national corporations react is typified by the following quote from' 
the Treasurer of a multi-national corporation at the "Conference on the Future 
of Financial Services Industry 11 ,sponsored. by the American Bankers Assn., 
Washington, January 1981. 
"All of us had our eyes opened last March with the imposition of credit 
controls, and they will come again, in my opinion. 11 --- 11 In the eyes of a 
corporate treasurer, however, they are probably among the most feared of a 11 
events, primarily because their form cannot be predicted in advance and they 
hit him where it hurts the most -- the final availability. of money. So what 
does a corporation do---. The answer lies in having as many different sources 
to tap as possible: 
(1) Credit lines with U.S. banks, preferably on a fee-paid 
committed basis. 
(2) Credit lines with foreign banks in U.S. dollars and also in 
their own local currencies. 
(3) Acceptance lines with foreign merchant banks to tap their 
equivalent to our commercial paper market. 
(4) Bankers' acceptance facilities in the U.S. and discount lines 
abroad to liquify your receivables. 
(5) Top commercial paper ratings ·and established acceptance for 
your paper in the marketplace. 
(6) Acceptance of the corporate name in the Euro-Dollar bond market. 
(7) Maintenance of at least an 1A1 bond. rating plus good liaison 
with the major rating agencies. 
(8) Borrowing and warehousing long-term, fixed rate money when and 
if it is available on reasonable terms rather than when it is 
needed. 11 
Compared with these eight sources of capital available to a multi-national 
corporation, small business has to look only to its local bank, friends, 
neighbors, or relatives, or in the event the small business has a short-term 
potential for rapid growth or a profile that would justify a public offering, 
then, and only then, are conventional venture capital funds available. 
In summary, the patient, indeed, has a terminal illness. Unfortunately, 
because it has a weak voice with government as well as financial institutions, 
when it complains, the usual response is typified by the doctor who advises 
the patient, "Take two aspirins, get a good night's rest, call me in the 
morning, and that will be $20, please. 11 
TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF CAPITAL: A Changing Scene. 
The local full-service commercial banlc has been the main source of commercial 
loans to business of all sizes in the community. In addition to its banking 
services, it provides an extremely valuable function as a financial advisor to 
its small business customers. The smaller the bank, the more direct and 
personal the relationship. From the newest commercial account using a 
short-term note with personal signature and personal assets as collateral, to 
the emerging company with an established rollover credit line of over a 
million dollars, the full-service bank continues to be the fundamental source 
of capital for small business in America. 
Due to the 1980 so-called "Bank Deregulation Act, 11 the American Bankers 
Association predicts that America's 14,500 banks will be concentrated through 
mergers and interstate banking to some 3,500 banks by 1985. It is axiomatic 
that 11 big banks make big loans and small banks make small loans. 11 What 
happens to the local bank as it becomes a branch, operating from policies of 
the money center bank or holding company? Hill the money center bank prime 
become the prime of the rural bank which in many cases makes commercial loans 
far below 11 New York Prime. 11 The American Bankers.Association further predicts 
the concentration of banking in the U.S. will make the system more efficient -
but the small business community (which opposed branch banking in Colorado) 
asks, 11 For whom?" 
.. 
THE U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION: A Changing Scene 
The SBA, aside from minority loan programs and special-interest, politically 
motivated miscellaneous programs, has fundamentally responded to small 
business capital needs with direct lending and guaranteed bank loans. The SBA· 
Administrator has just recommended the elimination of the direct loan program 
since its losses approached 44% of thi.s $700 million annual program involving 
subsidized interest rates. The bank guarantee loan program, wherein the SBA 
guarantees 90% of the loan made by the bank, has been highly successful. 
However, recent suggestions by the Administrator of reducing the amount of 
guarantee, together with· a request for comment of limiting the interest rate 
to no more than Prime, hints very strongly that the program is being 
i ntenti anally made less attractive to the.banking community. Some Washington 
observers consider this a strong signal for eliminating SBA as an independent 
agency. 
Although most small businesses are not thrilled with SBA and its loan 
programs, it is i rohi c to note that the government has guaranteed loans to two · 
companies, an automaker and a synfuels development company -for a total amount 
equal to more in just two loans then it does for all of its 14 million small 
business entrepreneurs. 
PRIVATE INVESTORS 
Except for rare circumstances, the typi~al private investor, when faced with a 
choice between investing in a listed stock versus a small business, has an 
.·easy choice to make. Purchase of a listed stock requires a 5-minute pho_ne 
call to a broker whose commission is tolerable, the down-side risk on the 
security is minimal, and he can- liquify his investment with another phone 
call. A small business investment, on the other hand, is usually 3 to 10 
years;. has almost no prospects for liquidity; - the down-side risk can be 
catastrophic and.he will often find him~elf a·partner in the management. In 
both cases, any ca'pital gains are treated exactly the same by the IRS. 
Until there are federal tax incentive's sufficient to divert capital away from 
the listed securities and other alternatives, this source of capital will 
remain a fairly insi-gnificant source of capital for small business. 
VENTURE CAP IT AL 
There are over 500 venture capital companies licensed by the Small Business 
Administration as small business investment corporations. The track record of 
companies _receiving SBIC funds is 600% better than companies riot receiving 
funds~ The reason is simply that they are selected by an expert who is. 
usually standing by to provide. additional financing if needed and who also· 
acts as a financial advisor, monitoring the company from a board of directors 
position. 
< • 
Unfortunately, the availability of government funds for SBIC's has been 
curtailed and many of these venture capital firms are reorganizing in a manner 
to better attract private capital and shed the constraints imposed by 
government regulations. There has been a dramatic increase in the amount of 
venture capital available in the past year, much of it in the form of pure 
venture capital limited partnerships. We should anticipate seeing an 
abundance of this type of capital available in the inter-mountain region. If 
there is a negative in this area, it is simply that the number of companies 
with a sufficient track record, good management, and high growth potential, 
represent a small percentage of the total small business community. 
PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
New public stock offerings of companies with a net worth of $5 million or less 
secured approximately $800 mi 11 ion from such offerings in· 1980. Much of this 
activity was fueled by venture capital companies which, by themselves, placed 
over a billion dollars in small growth companies in 1980 •. The public market 
for many small growth companies represented an opportunity to launch their 
companies using the cheapest source of funds, equity capital, from a public 
offering. 
Recent publicity about abuses in the Penny Stock Market have, with the 
downturn in economy, dampened the enthusiasm for new offerings. Many 
knowledgeable persons in the Denver financial community agree there have been 
abuses, but al so agree that they have been over-drama ti zed. They al so agree 
that the Securities and Exchange Commission . is fully justi fed in further 
relaxing the regulations which have been an impediment to small business for 
access to the public market •. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Throughout the WESTPO region, there are many pockets of high-technology growth 
industries. Even though they represent a small percentage of the number of 
small businesses in the region, they represent the cutting edge of the 
creative strength of America and should be counted on to provide a basic 
source of employment in the post-energy boom era. 
Venture capital and its access to institutional funds, not otherwise available 
to small business, should be encouraged. The "invisible hand" of th~ 
marketplace is already at work successfully in this area. 
Access to the public market should be protected and the abuses in public 
offerings should be control led by enforcement mechanisms rather than new 
constraining regulations. 
Attached as Exhibit 2 is a profile of a high-technology growth company from 
product conception to maturity. The most critical need for capital occurs in 
the first two to five years of research and development and startup costs. 
11 Seed money" is generally only available from personal investment with some 
later help through commercial bank loans with personal guarantees. 
Recommendation No. 1. Design tax incentives to encourage the private sector 
to develop innovation centers with access to 11 Seed capital" pools, supported 
by management assistance. 
Recommendation No. 2 Encourage state deregulation, patterned after the 
Federal Regulatory Flexibility Act. 
Recommendation No. 3. Restrict the use of Industrial Development Bonds and 
preserve their availability through umbrella pooling as the only long-term, 
low-cost source of capital now available for small businesses and small 
governments. 
Recommendation No. 4. Encourage the development of business development 
companies (B.D.C.'s) involving participation by the banking community. 
Recommendation No. 5. Explore the incentives to encourage voluntary energy 
company participation in a venture and seed capital long-term severance fund. 
Recommendation No. 6 Avoid the use of 11 aspirin 11 type measures which only mask 
the illness, but insist upon cures which do not require the continous invasion 
of public funds. 
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